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Abstract—Restructuring of the electricity market has changed 
many aspects of the transmission system operation and planning. 
Reliability-Driven and Economic-Driven transmission expansion 
planning by regulated and private utilities are the substitutes of 
the traditional Cost-Driven transmission expansion planning.  
Reliability–based criteria for assessment of the transmission 
projects are almost well-developed while there exists a lack of a 
comprehensive framework for the economic evaluation of the 
transmission projects.  
 
Definition of a quantitative and monetary framework for 
economic evaluation of future transmission projects demands a 
detailed market analysis. In addition, specific characteristics and 
responsibilities of the transmission system in the open access 
structure must be understood comprehensively. To reaching the 
aforementioned goal, an analytical review on the existing 
economic assessment methodologies would be highly beneficial 
for the researchers in this area. 
 
Moreover, most of the review literatures on transmission 
investment in competitive electricity markets are general. These 
review literatures have tried to address all aspects of this 
challenging issue with devoting only few paragraphs to economic 
assessment of transmission projects.  
 
Given the aforementioned shortcomings, this article would bridge 
the gap by the following contributions: Firstly, reviewing 
available approaches for economic assessment of transmission 
projects based on research papers and industrial reports 
,Secondly, analysing the reviewed criteria critically by applying 
them to a modified Wood and Wollenberg 6-bus case study and 
Finally, summarizing the key components of a successful 
Economic Assessment Framework for transmission expansion or 
upgrade projects.  
Practical experiences of California Electricity Market, New 
England Electricity Market, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Maryland (PJM) and National Electricity Market, Australia have 
been accommodated in the article. 
 
Index Terms—Economic Assessment, Transmission 
Expansion, Analytical Review 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Before deregulation has been introduced to the electricity 
industry in 1990s, the power system had experienced a long 
monopoly and deterministic environment. In vertically 
integrated power systems network expansion was intended to 
meet the present and future system reliability at the minimum 
cost. By restructuring of the electricity market and over the 
                                                           
 
past decade, issues of electricity market liberalization have 
been investigated from different perspectives [30]. In parallel 
with this evolution in the electricity industry, the expansion 
planning objectives of the transmission system have changed. 
In this context, the new objectives could be categorized as 
three groups, namely, (i) to maintain system reliability 
standards (ii) to keep the environmental impacts of expansions 
at the proper level and (iii) to improve the economic 
performance of electricity market.  
 
Reliability indices are not new for transmission planners. 
Transmission planners have experienced well developed 
indices in the traditional expansion planning of the 
transmission systems. Main researches in this area have been 
focused on the extension of traditional reliability indices. 
Probabilistic reliability assessment [11] and value based 
reliability studies [12] are some typical extensions of the 
reliability indices addressing the new environment of 
electricity industries. 
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, nations would commit to 
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to at least 5% below 
1990 base line levels by the year 2012.  
As a result, the burden is increased on transmission planner to 
have accurate studies on the environmental impacts of the 
future transmission development. A few approaches are 
discussed with mixed successes in some and failures in others.  
Integrating of the environmental impacts in the planning 
methodology is an emerging issue, which does not have 
received the appropriate attention until now. 
 
With the guidelines of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) of the US on Standard Market Design 
(SMD) [5] and the recent reviewing of Council of Australian 
Government (COAG) on the design and implementation of 
electricity restructuring in Australia [3], the definition and 
development of metrics for measuring the performance of the 
electricity market has emerged as a contemporary issue.  
On the other hand, transmission system planners would use 
these performance metrics in their studies to improve the 
electricity market performance by the effective design of 
transmission system.  
Moreover, most of the literature surveys on transmission 
planning in deregulated electric systems are general and try to 
review[23], [25], [26], [27], [28], [29],[30] all the aspects of 
this multi dimensional problem. Considering existent and 
emerging issues in the expansion planning of transmission 
system, the necessity for more specific surveys are highly 
demanded. This article bridges the gap and reviews different 
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alternatives for the economic assessment of the electricity 
market form the view point of transmission expansion 
projects.  
Reviewed metrics are grouped into main and ancillary 
measures and have been analysed by applying them to a 
common 6-bus test system. Based on the analytical review, the 
necessary ingredients of a successful module in the economic 
assessment of transmission projects using the main and 
ancillary measures have been extracted and summarised. 
  
The organization of this paper excluding the introduction part 
is as follows; the mathematical formulation of the electricity 
market used for analysis has been given in section II, Section 
III gives a detailed overview on performance metrics of 
electricity market in the transmission investment problem. An 
analysis of the reviewed indices using a typical 6-bus 
transmission system and the extracted framework for 
economic assessment of transmission projects are presented 
through section IV. Finally, the conclusion remarks in section 
V will close this paper. 
 
II.  MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE ELECTRICITY 
MARKET 
Under competition, the well-know social welfare optimization 
problem is the background of the most economic measures of 
transmission investment projects. Without loss of generality, 
the linear version of the social welfare optimisation problem 
has been adopted for mathematical presentation of reviewed 
indices [13],[14],[15].  
The mathematical formulation of the social welfare 










~)(PC~Min                                               (1) 
Subject to the supply-load balance equation, quality of 
transmission network, and system inequality constraints,  
λθ ⇔−= dgx PPB̂                                                        (2) 
μθ ⇔≤≤− lll FHF ˆ                                                      (3) 
maxmin
ggg PPP ≤≤                                                          (4) 
maxmin
ddd PPP ≤≤                                                     (5) 
In equations (1) through (5),  
 
NG: total number of generators in the transmission network,  
iC
~
: the apparent cost function of generator i in $/hr,  
Pgi: the output generation of the generator i in MW,  
ND: total number of price sensitive loads, 
jB
~
: apparent benefit function of dispatchable load j in $/hr, 
Pdj: the dispatched load of sensitive load j in MW, 
xB̂ : suseptance matrix of transmission network in mho., 
δ : vector of the node angles in radian, 
lĤ : branch node matrix of transmission network in mho, 
lF : vector of maximum flows of lines in MW, 
min
gP : vector of minimum generation capacity in MW, 
max
gP : vector of maximum generation capacity in MW, 
min
dP : vector of minimum demand in MW, 
max
dP : vector of maximum demand in MW, 
λ : vector of nodal prices in $/MWh 
μ : vector of the shadow prices of flow limits in $/MWh 
 
Section III gives a detailed review of economic measures of 
transmission expansion or upgrade projects. 
III.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE METRICS IN THE TRANSMISSION 
INVESTMENT PROBLEM – A REVIEW 
For this review, the article has attempted to narrow down 
the list and focus on the most comprehensive metrics used in 
the related literatures. An exact definition along with its 
mathematical formulation has been provided for each 
introduced metric. 
 
A.  Social Welfare or Aggregated Surplus (TS )[31],[32],[34] 
The participants of the electricity market are (1) consumers, 
C, (2) producers, P, and (3) transmission network owners or 
congestion revenue right holders, CRRH. Hence, the social 
welfare is the aggregated values of market participants’ 
benefits.  
Producers’ benefit or surplus (PS) can be defined as the 
difference between the aggregated revenue and apparent cost 






























μλλ                              (8) 
 
The total surplus is defined as the aggregated value of 
participants’ surpluses; 
CRCSPSTS ++=                                                          (9) 
Based on (9), benefit of transmission expansion or upgrade 
project can be evaluated as (10). 
oww TSTSTS /|| −=Δ                                                      (10) 
Where, wTS |  is the Total Surplus with transmission 
expansion or upgrade and owTS /| is the Total Surplus without 
transmission expansion or upgrade project. In this formulation, 
the expansion or upgrade project which has the highest 
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positive change in the Total Surplus would be preferable.  
 
B.  Electricity Market Efficiency Loss or Congestion Cost 
[31][32][33]  
Efficiency loss of the electricity market is defined as 
decrease in social welfare due to transmission network 
constraints. Mathematically speaking, 
TSSTEL −′=                                                                (11) 
Where, EL is the efficiency loss, ST ′ is the total surplus 
without transmission constraints, and TS is the total surplus of 
the system. 
)||( /oww ELELEL −−=Δ                                               (12) 
In this measure, the expansion or upgrade projects which 
have highest positive change would be selected. 
 
C.  Congestion Rents or Congestion Revenue [31][32][33] 
Congestion rent or revenue is defined as the money 
collected by the system operator because of congestion in 
transmission network. Mathematically speaking, it can be 
formulated as the equation (8). Congestion revenue as the 
third component of the total surplus can be understood as the 
congestion revenue right holders’ income who might be 
producers, consumers, or merchant transmission owners.  
 
D.  Individual Producer Surplus[31][32][33] 
Individual producer surplus is defined as (13). 
)(~ giigiii PCPPS −= λ                                                          (13) 
Individual producer surplus is the difference between producer 
revenue and producer cost. 
 
E.  Individual Consumer Surplus[31][32][33] 
The difference between individual consumer willingness to 
pay and consumer paying is called individual consumer 
surplus. Mathematically speaking, 
djjdjjj PPBCS λ−= )(
~                                                         (14) 
 
F.  Nodal Producer Surplus[31][32][33] 
Nodal producer surplus is defined as the summation of the 










)(~λ                                                 (15) 
Where Nx is Node x of system, and xNNG is the total number 
of generators connected to node x.  
G.  Nodal Consumer Surplus [31][32][33] 
Summation of the surpluses of all consumers connected to 










)(~λ                                              (16) 
Where Nx is Node x of system, and xNND is the total number 
of demands connected to node x.  
 
H.  Producers’ Surplus[31][32][33]    
Difference between what the producers collects from the 
system and the real costs of production is called producers’ 
surplus. Equation (6) is the mathematical definition of this 
index. 
 
I.  Consumers’ Surplus [31][32][33]    
Difference between the demand bids and the demand 
payments is consumers’ surplus. Equation (7) is the 
mathematical definition of this index. 
 
J.  Redispatch Power [31][32][33] 
The redispatched power is defined by the increase, if any, 








* )(Δ  ….                                           . (17) 
Where, P*gi is the generation of the ith generator without 
transmission constraints, and Pgi is the generation with 
transmission constraints. I is an integer with the following 
definition; 
 
                                                                                       (18) 
 
 
K.  Redispatch Cost[31][32][33] 
The redispatched cost is defined as the difference between 
the costs of the energy considering transmission constraints 
and the cost of providing the same energy without 
transmission constraints.  
 
L.  Load Payment Costs[31][32][33] 
Difference in demand payments with and without 
congestion is load payment costs. 
 
M.  Total Congestion Cost-Definition [1] 
This paper proposes a methodology to promote fair 
competition for short term transmission planning by using 
assessment of transmission line congestion cost index. 
The proposed network congestion assessment method is 
describes as follows. First, given the bidding power of every 
bus determined in the network, the line power flow can be 
determined by using the load flow without considering 
transmission congestion. Next, when there is a line congestion, 
operation power in each bus is redispatched in order to 
eliminate the line congestion. The redispatched power at a bus 
is under/over than the bidding power determined in the market 
and leads to an extra cost. The total economic cost resulting 
from the congestion can be quantified from the bidding power 
and operation power in each bus.  
I = 
0                gigi PP
*<  
1                gigi PP
*≥  
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The bidding power and power price rate at bus k are Pbk and 
Rb, respectively. The bidding power price rate is common to 
all busses, since the price rate is assumed to be determined at 
the equilibrium point of supply and demand in the market. If 
there is a congestion, power is redispatched to eliminate the 
congestion. Redispatched operation power and power price 
rate are Pok and Rok, respectively. Now, the operation power 
price rates are different for each generator bus because the 
incremental cost curve (ICC) of each plant is different.  
If there is a line in which the line flow exceeds the line 
capacity, then the line has congestion. For single line 
congestion, congestion cost index (CCI) for bus k can be 
calculated as  
bkbokokk PRPRCCI −=                                                         (19) 
Total Congestion Cost Index (TCCI) of the transmission also 






2)(                                                           (20) 
where B is the set of all busses. 
For multiple line congestion, the TCCI can be calculated in a 
similar manner to the single line congestion case. However, it 
is necessary to know the contribution of congestion of a 
particular line to the TCCI. It is difficult to calculate the CCI 
for congestion of each line due to the non linearity of power 
system.  
Therefore, an approximate method is proposed to calculate the 
contribution of line congestion to the TCCI. It is assumed that 
the CCI for single line congestion is proportional to its 
contribution to the TCCI resulting from the multiple line 
congestion. 
 
N.  Congestion Cost- Definition [2] 
Congestion cost of a line is defined as the opportunity cost of 
transmitting power through it. 
21
)( 12 iiiii PlmplmpCC −=                                                          (21) 
Where CCi is the congestion cost of line i in $/hr, 1ilmp , and 
2ilmp  are LMPs of end buses of line i in $/MWh, and 21iiP is 
power of line i from bus i1 to bus i2 in MW. Total congestion 
cost of the network is equal to  
∑= iCCCC                                                                        (22) 
As more transmission lines are congested, i.e., as 
constraints for dispatching the cheapest undispatched 
generations increase, LMP differences among buses and 
consequently congestion cost increase. Therefore, congestion 
cost is a proper criterion for measuring price discrimination 
and consumer constraints. Consequently, congestion cost is a 
proper criterion for measuring the degree of competitiveness 
of an electric market. 
 
O.  Consumer Total Payment [2] 
From the viewpoint of consumers, total payment for the 
electric power, i.e., total congestion cost plus total payment to 
generators, is important and hence it can be used as the 
criterion for transmission planning. The criterion, however, 
does not consider the competition. 
 
P.  Flatness of price profile [2] 
In nodal pricing all participants purchase and sell electric 
energy at the LMP of their buses. In order to provide a 
competitive environment for all participants to purchase and 
sell energy at the same price, nodal prices must be made equal. 
In odder words, price profile must become flat. As the price 
profile becomes flatter, difference among LMPs decrease. 
Therefore, customers purchase and sell energy at less 
discriminative prices and consequently competition is 
encouraged.  
 
Q.  Lerner Index [7] 
Lerner Index has been used as a measure of competitiveness in 




PPLI )( −=                                                                  (23) 
Where, Pm is the market price and Pc is the estimated 
competitive price. In competitive markets, usually, Pm is the 
average of the electricity price over a specific region and Pc is 
the estimated competitive price based on the estimation of the 
marginal cost of generators. 
 
R.  Quantity Weighted Lerner Index [7] 

























                                               (24) 
Where, qt is the total demand in the region and T is the 
duration of the study (other parameters are defined as section 
Q). This index has been calculated for New England 
Electricity market in [20], for California Electricity Market in 
[19].  
 
S.  Modified Lerner Index [7]  
Modified Lerner Index is defined as section S but in the 
calculation of competitive benchmark prices the effects of 
transmission system has been considered. Other studies like 
[17], [18] has not considered the effect of transmission system 
on their competitive benchmark price calculation. 
 
T.  Residual Supply Index (RSI) [40] 
For a given level of demand D the residual supply index (RSI) 














1                                                          (25) 
Where, qk is the total capacity of firm k. when RSI greater than 
100 percent, suppliers other than firm i have enough capacity 
to meet the demand of the market, and firm i has less influence 
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on the market. On the other hand if the RSI is lower than 100 
percent, firm i is a pivotal player in the market. 
 
U.  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)[40] 
The HHI is the sum of the squares of the market shares in the 
percentage. It is a statistical index that is often used to 
measure the degree of ownership concentration among 
suppliers in a relevant market. This index can measure the 
static generation capacity concentration very well. 
 
V.  System Dynamic Herfindahl-Hirschman Index [10] 
The system dynamic index is energy based and takes 
transmission congestion into the consideration. This index can 
evaluate two components of the market power, namely, 
generation concentration and transmission congestion in one 
index.  
It is based on the partitioning of the system into groups of 


















HHI                                                        (26) 





MWh is the share of each generator in one specific group 
from the total generation of that group.  
Finally, system HHI is defined as the square root of weighted 
average group HHI based on the generation shares in 





















2                                           (27) 
 
In this criterion, the number of groups is a measure of the 
market power due to congestion and the HHIS is the measure 
of the market power because of generation concentration. 
 
W.  National Electricity Market (NEM) - Australia [8] 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) is built 
on an interconnected, multistate power system with total 
length of around 4000km and relatively small demand of 
30GW [35]. The national Electricity Market Management 
Company (NEMMCO) is market and power system operator 
and planning manager. 
 
The Statement Of Opportunities (SOO) report and the 
Annual National Transmission Statement (ANTS) report along 
with the more detailed planning report produced by each 
Regulated Transmission Network Service Providers (RTNSP), 
provide a basis for the expansion planning of the transmission 
system. The regulated transmission network providers 
undertake the transmission planning within their territories 
according to a “regulatory test” provided by the Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER) as a part of Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC). 
 
The economic performance measurement part is a “Cost –
Benefit Test”, which must identify the best option, with a 
positive net benefit under most scenarios of future market 
development. 
Because of the practical difficulties in implementing this 
test, currently it is not accommodated in the planning 
algorithms of the regulated transmission network service 
providers. 
Moreover, AER has recently [21], [22] introduced the 
following metrics for measuring of congestion impact on 
NEM.  These indices are useful for economic evaluation of the 
transmission network: 
 
P.1 Total Cost of Constraint (TCC) 
TCC is defined as the difference between the dispatch cost, 
equation 1, with and without transmission constraint. 
Mathematical formulation of TCC is detailed in section A. 
 
P.2 Outage Cost of Constraint (OCC) 
OCC is defined as the difference of the dispatch cost 
between two cases; (a) without transmission lines due to 
outages (planned or unplanned) and (b) with transmission 
lines due to outages when their constraints are removed.  
 
P.3 Marginal Cost of Constraints (MCC) 
The MCC is derived by summing up the marginal 
constraint values reported with every constraint for every five 
minute dispatch interval over the year to obtain a Cumulative 
Marginal Value (CMV). 
 
X.  California Electricity Market – Transmission Economic 
Assessment Methodology (TEAM)[36][37] 
Transmission Economic Assessment Methodology (TEAM) 
introduced by the California Electricity Market does not 
consider the load elasticity. A predefined Value of Lost Load 
has been considered as the highest value of electricity for all 
consumers in the system. 
TEAM proposes two alternatives for economic evaluation of 
the transmission expansion or upgrade projects.  
 
The first methodology is through measuring of the social 
benefit of transmission expansion or upgrade project. This 
approach has been detailed in section A.  
 
The second measure is called Modified Societal Test. In 
modified societal test measure, Monopoly Rent (Mrent) is 
defined as the excess surplus of producers because of strategic 
biding. This test excludes producers’ monopoly rent in the 
surplus calculation and change in monopoly rent in benefit 
calculation. 
MrentTSST ΔΔΔ −=′                                                        (28) 
In modified societal test by giving the same weight to the 
monopoly rent as the other market participants, transmission 
expansion or upgrade projects will be selected not only based 
on the maximisation of total surplus but also minimisation of 
the monopoly rent. 
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Y.  New York Electricity Market [38] 
To suit various needs for viewing the impact of congestion, 
four congestion metrics were developed by New York ISO.  
 
Z.1 Change in Production Cost 
This metric has the same definition of section P.1.  
 
Z.2 Change in Congestion Payments 
Change in congestion payment is defined as the difference 
between congestion payment of loads, the sum of the 
locational marginal price congestion component times the load 
affected, with and without transmission constraints.  
 
Z.3 Change in Payments to Generators 
The difference between the payments to generators in cases of 
with and without transmission constraints is defined as the 
change in payments to generators. 
 
Z.4 Change in Load Payments 
The difference between the load payment in cases of with and 
without transmission constraints is defined as the change in 
load payments. 
 
Z.  New England Electricity Market [39] 
New England electricity market has introduced a set of indices 
for the evaluation of its electricity markets. With some 
changes these indices can be used for evaluation or final check 
up, ancillary indices, of transmission expansion or upgrade 
projects.  
 
AA1. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for the System and Specific 
Areas 
HHI definition in New England Electricity market is the some 
as it was detailed in section V. 
 
AA2. Market Share by Participant Bidder 
The generation capability for the lead participants with the 
largest portfolios during one year can be a measure of 
concentration in the market. 
 
AA3. Forward Contracting 
Estimates of the level of forward contracting and self-supply 
generation in an electricity market are important in evaluating 
how well the electricity market is working. Forward 
contracting not only insulates load from short-term price 
volatility, it also serves as an incentive for generators to offer 
generation at marginal cost. Level of forward contracting has a 
close relationship with a successful transmission expansion 
planning. 
 
AA4. Residual Supply Index 
Mathematical calculation of RSI is the same as definition in 
section U, but New England electricity market only considers 
the largest seller’s supply in its calculation. 
 
AA5. Competitive Benchmark Analysis 
The definition of this measure is the same as section S. 
 
AA6. Implied Heat Rates 
This index might be used as an ancillary index for final check 
up of the transmission projects. The market prices for 
electricity and fuel are used by the New England Electricity 
market to derive the heat rate of various tapes of generators. If 
the price of a fuel rises at a rate more than that of electricity, 
even generators with high thermal efficiency may not be able 
to recover fuel costs or to earn additional revenues while 
producing the electricity. A successful long-term transmission 
planning can play as an issuance for lowering the price of 
electricity and keeping the efficient generators in the market. 
 
AA7. Net Revenues and Market Entry 
New England electricity market compares market revenues 
with the revenue requirements for a new generating unit 
seeking to enter the market. A successful transmission 
planning can help to distribute the generators uniformly over 
the transmission system and raises the competitiveness in the 
market. This index can be used as an ancillary index. 
 
AA.  Pennsylvania, New jersey, and Maryland 
Electricity Market (PJM) [6][4] 
Planning the enhancement and expansion of transmission 
capability on a regional basis is one of the primary functions 
of regional transmission organizations. PJM implements this 
function through the Regional Transmission Expansion 
Planning (RTEP) process described in Schedule 6 of the PJM 
Operating Agreement [6]. 
PJM’s RTEP process includes an economic planning 
component. It is designed to develop cost-effective solutions 
to alleviate congestion on the transmission system. The PJM 
Economic Planning Process still is under development as part 
of market-efficiency initiatives and is evolving through an 
extensive stakeholder process [4]. 
Tables 1 and 2 summarises the economic measures introduced 









Table 1 Summary of economic assessment metrics for transmission expansion 
or upgrade projects (Main Indices) 
Metric 









Aggregated Surplus √ × × 
Efficiency Loss √ × × 
Congestion Revenue √ × × 
Producers’ Surplus √ × × 
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Consumers’ Surplus √ × × 
Individual Producer Surplus √ × × 
Individual Consumer Surplus √ × × 
Nodal Producer Surplus √ × × 
Nodal Consumer Surplus √ × × 
Redispatch Power √ × × 
Redispatch Cost √ × × 
Total Congestion Cost[1] √ × × 
Congestion Cost [2] √ × × 
Cost –Benefit Test √ × × 
Outage Cost of Constraint √ × × 
Marginal Cost of Constraint √ × × 
Change in Payments to Generators √ × × 
Change in Load Payments  √ × × 
Flatness of price profile [2] × √ × 
Lerner Index [7] × √ × 
Quantity Weighted Lerner Index [7] × √ × 
Modified Lerner Index [7] × √ × 
Residual Supply Index (RSI) × √ × 
HHI × √ × 
System Dynamic HHI × √ × 
Modified Societal Test √ √ × 
 
Table 2 Summary of economic assessment metrics for transmission expansion 
or upgrade projects (Ancillary Indices) 
Metric Description 
Market Share by Participant Bidder AA.2 
Forward Contracting AA.3 
Implied Heat Rates AA.6 
Net Revenues and Market Entry AA.7 
 
Since firstly, the analysis of the all introduced metrics can not 
be accommodated in a single paper and secondly, some of 
introduced indices have the same nature, a group of 
representative indices has been selected.  Economic 
assessment of a gradual transmission upgrade pattern has been 
calculated by selected metrics. A typical 6-bus transmission 
system has been used in the aforementioned analysis. Section 
V will present a critical analysis on selected measures. 
 
IV.  ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE METRICS IN THE TRANSMISSION 
INVESTMENT PROBLEM – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
V.1 Modified Wood and Wollenberg 6-bus case study[16] 
The single line diagram of Modified Wood and Wollenberg 6-
bus case study has been shown in figure 1. The system has 
three generators with total capacity of 580MW installed at 
buses 1, 2, and 3. Three loads with total demand of 570MW, 
190MW each, have been connected to buses 4, 5, and 6. Initial 
total transmission capacity is 570MW which will be upgraded 
consequentially by 20MW steps according to pattern shown in 
figure 2. The gradual upgrade of transmission system is based 
on the congestion revenue of each transmission line. The line 
with the highest congestion revenue is chosen for 20MW 
upgrade of capacity. 
 
Figure 1 Single line diagram of modified Wood and Wollenberg 6-bus test 
system [ww] 
 




Figure 3 Total surplus in $/h vs. different scenarios of upgrading 
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Figure 4 Total producers’ surplus in $/h vs. different scenarios of upgrading 
 
 
Figure 5 Total congestion revenue in $/h vs. different scenarios of upgrading 
 
 
Figure 6 Total consumers’ surplus in $/h vs. different scenarios of upgrading 
 
Figure 7 HHI index in percent unit vs. different scenarios of upgrading 
 
 
Figure 8 Average of nodal prices in $/MWh vs. different scenarios of 
upgrading 
 
As in figure 3, the upgrade pattern has caused a steady 
increase in total surplus of the system.  
An important feature is that the total surplus has an asymptotic 
behaviour. Total surplus without transmission constraints is 
the asymptote of this curve. Therefore the change in total 
surplus as a result of transmission capacity upgrade is 
bounded. Such a characteristic can be seen in producers’ 
surplus, consumers’ surplus and congestion revenue of the 
system too. Asymptotic phenomenon is due to supply and 
demand functions and trading area in economy.  
Another feature which can be drawn by comparing figure 3 
with figure 4, 5, and 6 is the conflicting pattern among the 
total system surplus, producers’ surplus, consumers’ surplus, 
and congestion revenue of the system. For example, upgrade 5 
will be assessed based on the total surplus and total 
consumers’ surplus a positive one while this upgrade will not 
be accepted based on the total producers’ surplus and 
congestion revenue. This conflicting pattern can be seen 
frequently through our upgrade pattern, such as upgrade 4, 9 
and 11.  
 
Regarding competitiveness indices, as HHI in figure 7, all of 
them are static and do not consider the effects of transmission 
system in their calculation. System dynamic HHI index is one 
step in solving these shortcomings.  
 
And finally nodal prices have been used as another signal for 
evaluation of transmission project. Transmission upgrade 4 
and 7 are two typical upgrades for which the average for nodal 
prices is high which total surplus is improved. Regarding 
transmission upgrade 7, producers’ surplus and congestion 
revenue are increased while the consumers’ surplus is 
decreased. 
 
Outage Cost of Constraint (OCC) introduced by Australian 
Energy Regulator could evaluate the contingency cost of 
transmission expansion or upgrade projects in monetary term. 
OCC can be used as an insurance cost for transmission 
upgrade or expansion projects.  
 
Finally, ancillary indices introduced in table 2 can be used as 
the final check up for transmission expansion or upgrade 
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projects. These indices would be very useful in exploring the 
impacts of transmission expansion as a structural change on 
other aspects of power system and electricity market.  
 
Changing the view angle, the ultimate goals of restructuring in 
electricity market have been reported [15] as lower prices and 
higher quality of services in short term and improvement in 
economic efficiency, competitiveness, and consumer freedom 
of choice in long term. A closer look at table 1 reveals that 
first set of indices evaluate the transmission projects based on 
the economic efficiency, and the second set of indices based 
on the competitiveness level in electricity market. As in table 
1, no index has been found for explicit evaluation of 
transmission projects on customer freedom of choice.  
 
Based on the above analytical review, figure 8 depicts the 
proposed framework for the economic assessment of 
transmission projects.  
 
 
Figure 9 The proposed economic assessment framework for calculating the 
monetary value of transmission expansion or upgrade projects 
 
According to figure 9, the proposed economic assessment 
framework has a two-step evaluation, namely, main and 
ancillary. Main evaluation can be carried out based on 
economic efficiency, competitiveness, (as reviewed in table 
1), contingency value, and customer freedom of choice as 
long-term indices or electricity prices and quality services as 
short-term indices. Uncertainty and network effects must be 
considered in t monetary evaluation. Ancillary indices as 
tabulated in 2 could be used as the final check up of the 
transmission projects and/or comparing two transmission 
projects with the same monetary value based on the main 
indices. Net revenue and market entry and forward contracting 
are two examples of these indices. 
V.  CONCLUSION REMARKS 
In this paper, we have presented a classified list of major 
metrics on economic assessment of transmission expansion or 
upgrade projects. The metrics have been classified as the main 
and ancillary measures. Main measures try to evaluate the 
transmission projects based on the economic efficiency and 
competitiveness of the electricity market. Also, ancillary 
measures consider the effects of the transmission projects on 
other aspects of the electricity market and power system. 
Ancillary measures would be useful for final check up of 
transmission projects. An analysis has been done by applying 
a group of the reviewed indices on a typical 6-bus 
transmission system. Based on the reviewed indices and 
considering the experiences of the California, New England, 
PJM, and NEM electricity markets a framework has been 
proposed for economic assessment of transmission projects. 
The proposed framework considers both main and ancillary 
metrics. Also, as two necessary parts, transmission network 
effects and uncertainties have been included in the flow of the 
proposed framework.  
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